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ABSTRACT
Recent work has demonstrated that neural networks are vulnerable to
adversarial examples. To escape from the predicament, many works
try to harden the model in various ways, in which adversarial training
is an effective way which learns robust feature representation so as
to resist adversarial attacks. Meanwhile, the self-supervised learning
aims to learn robust and semantic embedding from data itself. With
these views, we introduce self-supervised learning to against adver-
sarial examples in this paper. Specifically, the self-supervised rep-
resentation coupled with k-Nearest Neighbour is proposed for clas-
sification. To further strengthen the defense ability, self-supervised
adversarial training is proposed, which maximizes the mutual in-
formation between the representations of original examples and the
corresponding adversarial examples. Experimental results show that
the self-supervised representation outperforms its supervised version
in respect of robustness and self-supervised adversarial training can
further improve the defense ability efficiently.
Index Terms— Adversarial training, self-supervised, defense,
kNN
1. INTRODUCTION
Deep Learning has made a significant progress in computer vision,
natural language processing and etc. Various kinds of techniques
based on deep learning have been applied in practical engineering,
such as autonomous vehicles [1], disease diagnosis [2]. These em-
powered applications are life crucial, raising great concerns in the
field of safety and security. However, recently, many studies have
shown that the classifiers using neural network are not robust when
encountering attacks, especially adversarial examples.
Szegedy et al. proposed the concept of adversarial example for
the first time [3], which means that a subtle perturbation is added to
the input of the neural network to produce a wrong output with high
confidence. After that, plenty of methods for generating adversarial
examples have been developed, including gradient-based [4, 5, 6,
7], optimization-based [3, 8, 9] and etc. These methods show the
fragility of deep learning models.
On the opposite side, many defenses against adversarial exam-
ples have been proposed along two directions: model hardening
[4, 10, 11, 12, 13] ,input preprocessing [14, 15, 16, 17, 18]. As
for model hardening, adversarial training has been proven to be an
effective defense method. One convinced reason is that adversarial
training forces the neural network to learn the robust feature [19],
which is rarely affected by adversarial examples. Inspired by this
view, we are eager to find neural networks that naturally learn the
robust feature of images. Fortunately, self-supervised learning pur-
sues the similar destination and has been developed quickly in recent
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Fig. 1. The diagram of self-supervised adversarial training.
years. Self-supervised learning aims to learn robust and semantic
embedding from data itself and formulates predictive tasks to train a
model, which can be seen as learning the robust representation.
Generally, given the self-supervised feature, the classification
can be done with linear regression (LR) or k-Nearest Neighbors
(kNN). In this paper, we choose self-supervised feature coupled with
kNN as the final classifier. The reason can be intuitively observed
from the right part of Fig. 1 that even the modified sample has
crossed the decision boundary of LR, but it is still correctly classified
by kNN, meaning that kNN owns stronger robustness than LR.
To further enhance the robustness, self-supervised adversarial
training (SAT) is proposed. The object of SAT is to maximize the
mutual information (MI) between the representations of clean im-
ages and their corresponding adversarial examples, so the learned
feature can mitigate the effect of adversarial perturbation. The
method can be divided into two parts: generating adversarial exam-
ples, maximizing the MI. The adversarial examples are generated us-
ing gradient-based method, due to its high efficiency. Subsequently,
MI between the feature representations of clean and adversarial ex-
amples is maximized. In implementation, noise contrast estimator
is utilized to estimate MI. Then the model is updated by minimizing
the opposite value of estimated MI.
Our experimental results demonstrate that using the state-of-the-
art self-supervised feature representation coupled with kNN shows
stronger robustness against adversarial examples produced by both
gradient-based and optimization-based methods with respect to su-
pervised feature representation by a clear margin on CIFAR-10 and
STL-10. Besides, the robustness of self-supervised models can be
largely improved with SAT efficiently. Implementation-related file
will be available at https://github.com/everange-ustc/SAT.git.
2. RELATEDWORKS
2.1. Adversarial Examples
Adversarial examples are designed by an adversary to make ma-
chine learning system producing erroneous outputs. Most adver-
sarial examples on deep neural networks are generated by adding
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small perturbation to clean samples. For kNN classification meth-
ods, the attack operates by adding a perturbation δ to the input such
that its representation, f(x), moves closer to representations of xg,
a nearest group of training instances from a different class (xig for
i ∈ {1, 2, ...,m}). Intuitively, adversarial examples can be gener-
ated by solving the optimization problem[20]:
δˆ = arg min
δ
m∑
i=1
∥∥∥f (xig)− f(x+ δ)∥∥∥2
2
such that ‖δ‖p ≤  and x+ δ ∈ [0, 1]d
(1)
The optimization can be formulated as a Lagrangian, and we can
binary search the Lagrangian constant that yields the minimal per-
turbation. For example, the optimization can be solved with Adam
optimizer.
2.2. Defense
Many defenses against adversarial examples have been proposed
along two directions: model hardening, input preprocessing. For
model hardening, adversarial training shows satisfying performance
against adversarial examples. The standard adversarial training
(AT) in Madry’s work[5] can be formulated as:
arg min
θ
E(x,y)∈pˆdata (maxδ∈S L(θ, x+ δ, y)) (2)
where pˆdata is the underlying distribution of training data, L(θ, x, y)
is the loss function at data point x with the true label y for the neu-
ral network with parameters θ. δ is the permutation introduces by
PGD[5]. The accuracy drops fast using AT, there is an alternate
version[21], Mix-minibatch adversarial training (MAT):
arg min
θ
[E(x,y)∈pˆdata (maxδ∈S L(θ, x+ δ, y))+
E(x,y)∈pˆdata (L(θ, x, y))]
(3)
which helps to pursue the trade-off between accuracy on the clean
examples and robustness on the adversarial examples. Adversarial
logit pairing (ALP)[11] matches the logits from a clean example x
and its corresponding adversarial example x˜ during training, which
exhibits better performance:
J(B, θ) + λ 1
m
m∑
i=1
L (f (x; θ) , f (x˜; θ)) (4)
where B is a minibatch including clean examples x and the corre-
sponding adversarial examples x˜. f(x; θ) is function mapping from
inputs to logits of the model and J(B, θ) is the cost function used
for adversarial training. One potential reason of adversarial training
is that it forces the neural network to learn robust feature, which can
mitigate the affect of adversarial examples[19].
2.3. Self-supervised Learning
Self-supervised learning exploits internal structures of data and for-
mulates predictive tasks to train a model, which can be seen as learn-
ing the robust feature. Here are some representative works in this as-
pect: Contrastive Predictive Coding (CPC) [22] uses a probabilistic
contrastive loss which induces the latent space to capture informa-
tion that is maximally useful to predict future samples. Deep In-
fomax (DIM) [23] maximizes mutual information between global
features and local features. Augmented Multiscale DIM (AMDIM)
[24] maximizes mutual information between features extracted from
multiples views of a shared context.
Actually, the self-supervised representation has been used for
defense in previous works. [20] utilized the feature representation
coupled with kNN for classification. Both supervised and self-
supervised features are adopted. However, as mentioned in [20],
their method does not perform well on datasets bigger than MNIST.
[25] combined the self-supervised loss into the loss of traditional
adversarial training, but this training process is still time-consuming.
3. METHOD DESCRIPTION
As illustrated before, forcing the neural network to learn the robust
feature of the instance can help improve the robustness of the model.
Meanwhile, the self-supervised learning focuses on the robust fea-
ture, for example. they can predict the missing part of images us-
ing itself. Inspired by these point-views, we propose using self-
supervised representation cooperated by k-Nearest Neighbour for
defending against adversarial examples. Besides, we can maximize
the mutual information representation between clean and adversar-
ial examples by adjusting the existing model, so that the model can
further mitigate adversarial perturbation.
3.1. Self-supervised Representation for Defense
The self-supervised representation is coupled with kNN for classifi-
cation. After self-supervised training, the neural network is frozen
and adopted as a feature extractor. All instances in the training set
are fed into the network to obtain their representations on a spec-
ified layer, and then these representations serve as the feature li-
brary. Given an image, extract its feature representation, search the
k-nearest representations from the feature library, and then predict
the label of the image.
3.2. Self-supervised Adversarial Training
To further improve the robustness of self-supervised representations
cooperated with kNN, we propose a method called self-supervised
adversarial training (SAT), which maximizes the mutual information
between the representations of clean images and the corresponding
adversarial examples. As shown in Fig. 1, given the pretrained self-
supervised model, the framework of SAT is divided into two parts:
generating adversarial examples and maximizing the mutual infor-
mation.
3.2.1. Generating Adversarial Examples
Due to the introduced attack method in Section 2.1 is time-consuming,
we modified the generating method inspired by PGD[5]. In detail,
the gradient of the image is obtained firstly:
g = ∇
xt−1adv
m∑
i=1
‖f
(
xig
)
− f (xt−1adv )‖22 (5)
where∇ is the gradient operator, andm = 300 is the default setting.
Then update the image:
xtadv = x
t−1
adv − s · sign(g) (6)
where s is the update step size. To restrict the generated adversarial
examples within the -ball of xadv, we can clip xadv after each update.
For better distinction, we address the former method in Section 2.1
as optimization-based method and this as gradient-based method.
3.2.2. Maximizing Mutual Information
After obtaining the adversarial examples, we are going to maximize
the MI on the feature representation space. Formally, the MI be-
tween X and Xadv, with joint density p(x, xadv) and marginal densi-
ties p(x) and p(xadv), is defined as the KullbackLeibler (KL) diver-
gence between the joint and the product of the marginals:
I(X;Xadv) = DKL(p(x, xadv)‖p(x)p(xadv))
= Ep(x,xadv)
[
log p(x,xadv)
p(x)p(xadv)
] (7)
As for the feature representation, the MI can be defined as:
I (zi; zˆi) = E
zi,zˆi
[
log
p (zi, zˆi)
p (zi) p (zˆi)
]
(8)
where zi, zˆi are the feature representations of clean images and the
corresponding adversarial version, respectively. It is hard to obtain
the explicit distribution of representations, meaning that the MI can-
not be calculated. Instead, several methods have been proposed to
estimate MI, and here noise contrast estimator (NCE) is adopted,
whose estimated MI has been proved to be a low bound of MI[26],
defined by:
I(Z; Zˆ) ≥ E
[
1
N
∑N
i=1 log
Φ({zi,zˆi})
1
N
∑N
j=1 Φ({zi,zˆj})
]
, INCE(Z; Zˆ)
(9)
where zˆj is the representation of other adversarial example differ-
ent from zˆi. Here, we refer to representations from joint distribu-
tion as positives, i.e. pos ∼ p (zi, zˆi), pos = {zi, zˆi}, and repre-
sentations from the product of marginal distributions as negatives,
i.e. neg ∼ p (zi) p (zˆj), neg = {zi, zˆj}. N in in Equation (9) is
the number of negative pairs, and Φ(·) is the score function that is
higher for positive pairs but lower for negative pairs. Φ(·) can be
any continuous and differentiable parametric functions, such as co-
sine similarity function. Here, the matching score function is defined
as a simple dot product:
Φ (zi, zˆi) , φ1 (zi)> φ2 (zˆi) (10)
where φ1(·) and φ2(·) are small neural networks, for they can ap-
proximate any superb score functions. In implementation, the esti-
mated MI is maximized by minimizing its opposite value, named the
contrast loss:
Lcontrast = − E{zi,zˆi}
[
1
N
N∑
j=1
log
Φ ({zi, zˆi})∑N
j=1 Φ ({zi, zˆj})
]
(11)
The self-supervised neural network can be fine-tuned using back-
propagation through minimizing Lcontrast . The process will be kept
iterating until the performance meeting the requirement. To point
out, the whole process does not require the true label of data, similar
to the self-supervise learning. The pseudo-code of the framework is
given in Algorithm 1.
4. EXPERIMENTS
4.1. Setting
Dataset CIFAR-10 and STL-10 are selected as the dataset. The
CIFAR-10 dataset consists of 60000 32 × 32 labeled color images
in 10 classes, with 6000 images per class. There are 50000 training
images and 10000 test images. STL-10 is composed of 10 classes
Algorithm 1 Self-supervised Adversarial Training (SAT)
Require: Training samples X , perturbation bound , step size s,
maximization iterations per minimization step K, and mini-
mization learning rate τ .
1: Initialize θ with a pretrained self-supervised model f .
2: for epoch = 1 . . . Nep do
3: for minibatch B ⊂ X do
4: Build xadv for x ∈ B:
5: Assign a random perturbation
6: r ← U(−, )
7: xadv ← x+ r
8: for k = 1 . . .K do
9: L←∑mi=1 ∥∥f (xig)− f(xadv)∥∥22
10: gadv ← ∇xadvL
11: xadv ← xadv − s · sign(gadv)
12: xadv ← clip(xadv, x− , x+ )
13: end for
14: Calculate the representation of samples:
15: zˆ ← f(xadv), z ← f(x)
16: Update θ with stochastic gradient descent:
17: gθ ← Ex∈B [∇θ Lcontrast (z, zˆ)]
18: θ ← θ − τgθ
19: end for
20: end for
5000 96 × 96 labeled color images, 100000 unlabeled images for
training and 8000 labeled images for testing. For speedy training,
we resize the images in STL-10 to 64× 64.
Attack Method The attack is implemented under white-box
setting: the attacker has full information about the model (i.e.
knows the architecture, parameters, etc.). Both gradient-based and
optimization-based attack methods are utilized to evaluate the ro-
bustness of models. All the adversarial examples are generated
on the 1000 correctly predicted images on the testing set. For
the gradient-based attack methods, there are two kinds of setting:
 = 0.03, s = 0.005, and 10 iterations;  = 0.06, s = 0.005,
and 20 iterations, which is denoted as small perturbation and large
perturbation, respectively.
Evaluation Metric For kNN classification, k is 75 and faiss[27]
is adopted for speed consideration. The penultimate layer of neu-
ral network is adopted as the representation. The defense successful
rate (DSR), defined as the correct prediction rate on the adversarial
examples, is utilized to evaluate the robustness of the model against
gradient-based attack. `2 distance, the average `2-norm of pertur-
bation required to mislead the classifier, is used to measure the ro-
bustness against optimization-based attack. Larger `2 distance leads
to better robustness. The accuracy (ACC) of clean examples is also
presented to show the precision of the model.
4.2. Superior of Self-supervised Representation
In this experiment, the state-of-the-art self-supervised learning
method, AMDIM [24], and its supervised versions are compared
to present the superior of self-supervised feature representation in
the respect of robustness. These two methods are denoted by SSL
and SUP, respectively. The backbone of AMDIM is an encoder
based on the standard ResNet[28], with changes to make it suitable
for DIM. More details about the encoder, the readers can refer to
[23]. The parameters of the encoder for CIFAR-10 and STL-10
are set as (ndf=128, nrkhs=128, ndepth=3), (ndf=128, nrkhs=1024,
Table 1. The defense results of self-supervised representation and
supervised representation of AMDIM with kNN on CIFAR-10 and
STL-10.
Dataset Method ACC DSR `2 distance
Small Large
CIFAR-10 SUP 92.02% 18.7% 15.4% 0.378SSL 84.64% 51.9% 27.7% 0.667
STL-10 SUP 75.41% 24.2% 16.3% 0.970SSL 86.13% 54.9% 44.7% 1.591
(a) AMDIM (b) NPID
Fig. 2. The defense results of AMDIM and NPID using SAT on
CIFAR-10.
ndepth=8), respectively. For supervised learning, Adam optimizer
with learning rate 0.001 is adopted, and we trained the model for
400 epochs. For self-supervised learning, the learning rate is 0.0002
and the number of epoch is 300.
As shown in Table 1, the DSR of the self-supervised learning
model (SSL) of AMDIM outperforms its supervised learning model
(SUP) with a clear margin against gradient-based attack and the re-
quired `2-distance of successfully attacking SSL is larger than that
of the SUP on two datasets. On CIFAR-10, the ACC on the clean
images is lower than its supervised version, but the gain on the DSR
is large, 33.2% for small perturbation attack. On STL-10, the perfor-
mance is considerable, whose ACC outperforms that of supervised
version, benefiting from unlabeled images in the training phase. In
conclusion, the self-supervised representation owns stronger robust-
ness.
4.3. Effectiveness of SAT
To verify the effectiveness of SAT, unsupervised model NPID[29]
and self-supervised model AMDIM[24] are selected as the seed
models. The adversarial examples are generated by gradient attack
method with the small perturbation. Batch size 100, learning rate
0.0001 and Adam optimizer are the other setting for SAT. The re-
sults are presented in Fig. 2. It can be seen that the DSR improves
a lot after SAT with slight drop of accuracy for both AMDIM and
NPID against small and large perturbation attacks, verifying the
effectiveness of SAT.
We have also compared with the supervised adversarial train-
ing methods, and the adversarial examples are generated using PGD
with the same setting as the gradient-based method does. AMDIM is
selected as the seed model, and the results of these methods against
small and large perturbation attack are shown in Fig. 3, Fig. 4, and
the suffix represents which adversarial training method is adopted.
The closer to the top right corner in figures, the better the perfor-
(a) Small perturbation (b) Large perturbation
Fig. 3. The defense results of among self adversarial training and
supervised adversarial training on CIFAR-10. AMDIM is selected
as the seed model, and SUP and SSL mean the supervised and self-
supervised version.
(a) Small perturbation (b) Large perturbation
Fig. 4. The defense results of among self adversarial training and
supervised adversarial training on STL-10.
mance. For sufficient label dataset CIFAR-10, the SAT is worse than
the MAT, ALP, due to the original classification performance of self-
supervised learning is worse than supervised models. Analyzing the
development of self-supervised learning, we can see the gap between
self-supervised and supervised model is closer. With stronger self-
supervised model, the performance of SAT will become consider-
able. Furthermore, the time cost of SAT is much cheaper than that of
MAT and ALP. For dataset with a few labels, like STL-10, the perfor-
mance of SAT is significant. The trade-off between the robustness
and accuracy is better achieved by SAT than supervised versions,
especially for small perturbation attack, shown in Fig. 4. Since
the dataset with a little supervised information is common in many
downstream tasks, the proposed method SAT has a good prospect.
5. CONCLUSION
In this paper, we utilize self-supervised representation coupled
with kNN for classification, where the underlying reason is that
self-supervised model learns the robust feature of data. To further
strengthen the defense ability of self-supervised representation, a
general framework called self-supervised adversarial training is
proposed, which maximizes the mutual information between the
representations of original examples and adversarial examples. The
experiments show that the self-supervised representation of AMDIM
outperforms its supervised representation in the aspect of robustness
on CIFAR-10 and STL-10. Furthermore, self-supervised adver-
sarial training has been verified that it can be efficiently applied to
AMDIM and NPID, and significantly improve the robustness against
adversarial examples with slight drop of accuracy.
It is interesting to design self-supervised learning which consid-
ers adversarial attack in the training phase, so that the self-supervised
representation naturally owns strong robustness, which is one direc-
tion of our future work.
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